Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism by Gow, Laura
1 
 
Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism 
Laura Gow 
 
ABSTRACT 
Externalist representationalism is touted as a superior rival to naïve realism, and yet a careful 
analysis of the externalist representationalist’s analysis of our ordinary perceptual experiences 
shows the view to be far closer to naïve realism than we might have expected. One of the 
central advertised benefits of representationalist views in general is that they are compatible 
with the idea that ordinary, illusory and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are of the same 
fundamental kind. Naïve realists are forced to deny the ‘common fundamental kind claim’ and 
adopt disjunctivism. However, I argue that externalist representationalism is also a version of 
disjunctivism. Consequently, one of the main rivals to naïve realism turns out not to be a rival 
at all. 
 
Perception, Perceptual Experience, Representationalism, Disjunctivism, Naïve Realism  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Naïve realists hold that perceptual experience involves an essential relation between the perceiver 
and the physical objects in their environment. (Brewer, 2006; Campbell, 2002a) For naïve realists, 
the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences is constituted by our standing in such a 
relation to these objects.1 Since hallucinations do not involve essential relations between the 
perceiver and the physical objects in their environment, these experiences do not qualify as 
perceptual experiences. In other words, naïve realists endorse disjunctivism, which is the view that 
ordinary perceptual experiences, illusions and hallucinations do not form a common fundamental 
kind.  
For representationalists, the distinctive feature of perceptual experience is its capacity to 
represent the local environment of the perceiving subject. The phenomenal character of our 
perceptual experiences is grounded in (or constituted by, or identical to) their representational 
                                                
1 Naïve realists allow that other factors may play a role in determining phenomenal character. Brewer, 2011; 
Campbell, 2011a; Logue, 2012; Martin, 1998; Soteriou 2013. 
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content.2 Representationalism developed as an alternative to naïve realism, with the ambition of 
giving a unified account of ordinary perceptual experiences, illusions and hallucinations. 
Representationalists claim that the possibility of hallucinations which are subjectively 
indistinguishable from ordinary perceptual experiences is best explained by upholding the 
common fundamental kind claim.3 They hold that ordinary perceptual experiences, illusions and 
hallucinations all have representational content, and if the representational content is the same, 
then the phenomenal character of the experiences will also be the same. This brief characterisation 
of representationalism applies to both the internalist and externalist versions of the view. For 
internalists, our capacity for having representational states is due solely to internal features (Crane, 
2013), whereas for externalist representationalists, subjects must bear certain historical or 
functional relations to their environment (for example, causal covariation, teleofunctional or 
tracking relations) in order to be capable of undergoing representational states. (Dretske, 1995, 
2000; Tye, 1995, 2000, 2015a. Also see Millikan, 1984; Papineau, 1984.)  
At first pass, naïve realism and externalist representationalism seem to be very different 
views; indeed, a large part of the literature on perceptual experience is taken up with the debate 
over which of these two rival theories is correct. (See, for example, Brewer, 2006; Campbell, 
2002a; Martin, 2002.) However, in section two I will argue that a closer look at the externalist 
representationalist’s analysis of the metaphysics of ordinary perceptual experiences reveals a view 
which is very similar indeed to naïve realism. This is significant in itself, since externalist 
representationalism is one of the main rivals to naïve realism, yet it has an even more significant 
consequence: it turns out that externalist representationalists cannot uphold the claim that 
perceptual experiences, illusions and hallucinations form a common fundamental kind. Despite its 
insistence to the contrary, externalist representationalism is a form of disjunctivism. This will be 
the subject of section three. In section four I conclude that externalist representationalism cannot 
                                                
2 The precise nature of the relationship between phenomenal character and representational content does 
not bear on the point I wish to make in this paper. 
3 I will remain neutral regarding whether common fundamental kind views are to be preferred to 
disjunctivist views. What is important for my aim in this paper, is that externalist representationalists claim 
that their view is to be preferred to naïve realism because it avoids disjunctivism, and they believe that 
disjunctivist views fail to respond satisfactorily to the hallucination issue. If I can show that externalist 
representationalism is itself a version of disjunctivism, then their claimed superiority over naïve realist 
disjunctivism is significantly undermined.  
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be thought of as an interesting rival to naïve realist disjunctivism, and I explain the implications 
of this conclusion. 
2. EXTERNALIST REPRESENTATIONALISM AND ORDINARY PERCEPTUAL 
EXPERIENCE 
Externalist representationalists claim that the representational content of our perceptual 
experiences is fixed by the properties represented by the experience, which is ambiguous between 
two very different readings. The italicized phrase admits of an ontologically non-committal 
reading, according to which representing a property does not consist in standing in a two-place 
relation to that property (one can represent a property in this sense even if it turns out that the 
property does not exist). Tim Crane has pointed out that the appeal of representationalism in 
general comes from its allowing a sense in which we can represent objects and properties without 
being committed to the existence of those objects and properties. (Crane, 2006)  
As we will see in the following section, one of the main problems surrounding perceptual 
experience is the fact that we can have hallucinations that seem to involve essential relations to 
objects and properties in our environment when there are no (relevant) objects and properties 
present. The benefit of representationalism is that it can acknowledge that all perceptual 
experiences seem to be essentially relational without claiming that they actually are, thus avoiding 
the need to posit non-physical relata. What is more, disambiguating the phrase ‘the properties 
represented by the experience’ in the ontologically non-committal way explains why it is that our 
perceptual experiences have correctness conditions. The representational content of our perceptual 
experiences involves a claim (perhaps in the form of a proposition) about the way the world is that 
may or may not be correct. It is because the representational content is not constitutively world-
dependent that it is able, not only to ‘say’ things which get the world ‘right’, but also to say things 
that get the world ‘wrong’.  
On the alternative reading, the phrase ‘the properties represented by the experience’ 
commits its user to the existence of the properties in question.4 It is clear from the way externalist 
                                                
4 Brad Thompson (2008) points out a related equivocation between what he calls ‘content 
representationalism’ and ‘vehicle representationalism’. Content representationalists will disambiguate the 
phrase ‘the property represented by the experience’ in the second, ontologically committing way, whereas 
vehicle representationalists will disambiguate the problematic phrase in the first, non-ontologically 
committing way. Thompson accuses representationalists of switching between these two ways of 
understanding representationalism, emphasising the content reading to avoid the ‘veil of perception’ 
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representationalists interpret and use the claim that perceptual experience is ‘transparent’ that they 
understand the phrase in the second sense. Externalist representationalists appeal to the 
transparency of perceptual experience in their long-standing debate with qualia theorists, who 
argue that we cannot successfully account for the phenomenal character of our experiences without 
recourse to non-representational phenomenal properties or ‘qualia’. (See Block, 1996, 2010; 
Boghossian & Velleman, 1997/1989; Kind, 2003.) The function of the transparency claim, as it is 
used by externalist representationalists, is to show that the representational content (and 
phenomenal character) of each token perceptual experience is constitutively determined by the 
property which is represented by that experience – the actual property instantiated in the world.  
[T]he key transparency claims are as follows: in a case of normal perception, if we 
introspect: 
(1)  We are not aware of features of our visual experience.  
(2)  We are not aware of the visual experience itself.   
(3)  We cannot attend to features of the visual experience.   
(4)  The only features of which we are aware and to which we can attend are external 
features (colors and shapes of surfaces, for example) (Tye, 2014, p40)  
[W]e normally “see right through” perceptual states to external objects. (Lycan, 1996, 
p117) 
I experienced blue as a property of the ocean not as a property of my experience… It was 
the color, blue, not anything else that was immediately accessible to my consciousness and 
that I found so pleasing. (Tye, 2002, p448) 
When we introspect, we are aware of the external things and their properties but not of any 
internal experiences, nor any properties of those experiences, nor any related properties of 
ourselves…. the phenomenal character of my experience, what it (the experience) is like, 
how it feels, is a matter of the properties my experience represents. So, phenomenal 
character is out there in the world. (Tye, 2015b, p484) 
                                                
problem, and emphasising the vehicle reading to substantiate the claim that ordinary and hallucinatory 
experiences form a common kind. 
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These quotations commit the externalist representationalist to a very specific, and rather surprising 
account of the metaphysics of ordinary perceptual experiences: phenomenal character is ultimately 
constitutively dependent upon essential relations to externally located, instantiated properties. Two 
(interrelated) worries arise: first, it is difficult to establish the sense in which perceptual 
experiences are representational on this framework, and second, externalist representationalism 
does not seem to be significantly different from naïve realism. 
If the properties represented by the experience are simply the properties out there in the 
world, then the representational aspect of perceptual experience seems to have been analysed 
away. There must be something more to the representational content of a perceptual experience 
than simply externally located properties for us to be able to assess our experiences for accuracy 
or veridicality, but the externalist representationalist’s transparency claim seems to leave no room 
for anything but the externally located properties. It is significant that naïve realists also hold that 
the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences is constitutively determined by the 
perceiver’s standing in a two-place awareness relation to entities in her environment, yet they deny 
that perceptual experiences are representational.5 
The externalist representationalist could respond by claiming that being aware of the 
properties instantiated in one’s environment just is to represent those properties. In which case the 
view would differ from naïve realism over whether awareness is sufficient for (or the same thing 
as) representation – externalist representationalists holding that it is, and naïve realists holding that 
it is not. However, this response would only be successful if it was coupled with a good explanation 
of why we should think that awareness is sufficient for, or the same thing as, representation. As 
things stand, these two views would seem to agree that metaphysically speaking, the phenomenal 
character of our perceptual experiences is ultimately constituted by awareness relations to one’s 
local environment; it seems to be a simple awareness relation doing all the work.  
It is clear that externalist representationalists and naïve realists give very similar accounts 
of ordinary perceptual experiences, however, there is one respect in which the views do seem to 
                                                
5 It is not altogether clear that naïve realists must deny that perceptual experiences have representational 
content. While it is true that most naïve realists (eg. Campbell, 2002a; Brewer, 2006; and Travis, 2004) 
deny that perceptual experiences are representational, it has recently been argued that this need not be an 
essential feature of naïve realism. (See Schellenberg, 2011a and Nanay, 2014. Also see McDowell, 2013 
who holds a view according to which perceptual experiences are relational and representational.) 
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differ. For the most part, naïve realists emphasise the fact that the subject is aware of an object, 
whereas, for the externalist representationalist, the subject is aware of properties. (Naïve realists 
typically lay such importance on objects because they think that this explains our ability to have 
demonstrative thoughts about the things we perceive. See in particular Campbell, 2002a, 2002b, 
2011b.) In fact, I am not sure whether there really is a difference here. In the first place, it is worth 
pointing out that since an awareness of objects necessarily involves an awareness of their 
properties (we are aware of objects by being aware of their colours, shapes and locations, for 
example), naïve realists must hold that we are aware of propertied objects rather than ‘bare 
particulars’. Similarly, it is clear from the externalist representationalist’s particular way of 
understanding the idea that perceptual experience is transparent that, in fact, they hold that the 
phenomenal character of token ordinary perceptual experiences is constitutively determined by the 
properties which are instantiated by the objects in the perceiver’s local environment. Externalist 
representationalism was devised in order to provide a thoroughly naturalistic account of 
representation (which could solve the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness by grounding phenomenal 
character in representation). Since the analyses of representation offered by externalist 
representationalists depend on relations like causal covariation or tracking, the properties involved 
in these relations will have to be concrete, spatiotemporal, instantiated properties. Again, the 
externalist representationalist’s view turns out to be closer to naïve realism than we might have 
expected.  
It seems to me that in their haste to dismiss the idea that perceptual experiences require 
non-representational qualia, externalist representationalists have embraced a type of transparency 
claim which commits them to an unnecessarily strong form of externalism. This is unfortunate 
since it is avoidable; it is possible to appeal to the idea of transparency in defence of 
representationalism without locating phenomenal character in the world. In previous work (Gow 
2016) I have argued that there are two very different ways of understanding transparency which 
are standardly conflated. Perceptual experiences are (what I call) ‘phenomenologically 
transparent’ if they seem only to involve externally located objects and properties, and they are 
‘metaphysically transparent’ if they in fact only involve externally located objects and properties. 
It is clear from the quotations above that externalist representationalists understand transparency 
in the latter sense, and consequently, their view slides dangerously close to naïve realism. 
However, one can dispute the qualia theorist’s claim that some features of perceptual experience 
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are non-representational simply by arguing that perceptual experience is phenomenologically 
transparent – it only involves properties which seem to be externally located. 
In this section I have described the externalist representationalist’s account of token 
ordinary perceptual experiences and explained how their interpretation of the idea that perceptual 
experiences are transparent raises two difficulties with the view. First, it is unclear why ordinary 
perceptual experiences qualify as representational states on the picture that has emerged, and 
second (and relatedly), it is unclear whether externalist representationalism is really significantly 
different from naïve realism. In the next section I will argue that the similarity between externalist 
representationalism and naïve realism has an important consequence: like naïve realism, 
externalist representationalism is committed to disjunctivism.  
3. EXTERNALIST REPRESENTATIONALISM AND DISJUNCTIVISM 
Before I explain why externalist representationalism should be regarded as a disjunctivist view, it 
will be helpful to consider briefly those accounts of perceptual experience which are not 
disjunctivist.6 First we have the sense-data theory, which (in its standard formulation) analyses all 
perceptual experiences as being relations to mind-dependent sense-data. (Russell, 1912; Price, 
1950; Robinson, 1994; Jackson, 1977) In ordinary perceptual experiences we are indirectly related 
to the mind-independent world by being directly related to sense-data. This view tends to be 
rejected for having an inflated and decidedly non-physicalist ontology.  
Adverbialism is another ‘common fundamental kind’ view. (Kriegel, 2007; Chisholm, 
1957) On this account, perceptual experiences are to be analysed as subjects experiencing in 
certain ways rather than as involving a two-place relation to objects – so seeing a red round thing 
becomes ‘seeing-redly and roundly’. This view has been criticised for failing to account even for 
the apparent relationality of perceptual experience (Crane, 2006), and for being unable to 
distinguish between certain experiences – for example, an experience of a red square and a green 
circle on the one hand and an experience of a red circle and a green square on the other. It seems 
the adverbialist must give the same analysis of both: seeing redly and squarely and greenly and 
roundly. (Jackson, 1977) 
Lastly, an internalist version of representationalism according to which the content of a 
perceiver’s experience is determined by their internal features is also non-disjunctivist. (Crane, 
                                                
6 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that this would be helpful. 
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2013) The content of an ordinary perceptual experience and a hallucination will be the same if the 
subject’s internal state is the same in both situations. Of course, the cause of the experiences will 
be different, but the internalist will not permit the cause of an experience to enter into the identity 
conditions of that experience.7  
It should be noted that all three non-disjunctivist positions are internalist views and have 
been criticised for putting us in a sceptical position with respect to the mind-independent world. It 
is here that externalist representationalists have claimed a significant advantage. Because 
externalist representationalism emphasizes the historical relations perceivers have with their 
environment (such as evolution by natural selection) it claims to be a common fundamental kind 
theory without the epistemological drawbacks.8 However, in the remainder of this section I will 
argue that externalist representationalism cannot uphold the common fundamental kind claim. If 
this is right, then the whole structure of the perception debate has shifted – we will have internalist 
common fundamental kind theories with their arguably sceptical consequences on the one hand, 
and disjunctivist views on the other. 
We saw in the previous section that both the naïve realist and the externalist 
representationalist analyse ordinary perceptual experience as consisting in an essential relation to 
externally located objects, or properties instantiated by objects in the local environment (which I 
have suggested comes to pretty much the same thing). But of course, in the hallucinatory case there 
are no relevant objects or instantiated properties present in the subject’s environment. Since naïve 
realists simply define perceptual experience as being object-involving, hallucinations fail to 
qualify as genuinely perceptual experiences. Externalist representationalists on the other hand, 
claim to be able to uphold the common fundamental kind principle. Their claim is based on their 
official analysis of all perceptual experiences: perceptual experiences are representational states 
which can have the same representational content whether they are ordinary perceptual 
experiences or hallucinations. However, in this section I will argue that this claim is only 
superficially true.  
                                                
7 There are variants of these views which I have not gone into here since it would take me too far away 
from my main concern, which is that externalist representationalism does not qualify as a common 
fundamental kind view. 
8 It is outside the scope of this paper to comment on whether internalist views really do have undesirable 
sceptical consequences, and whether externalist views really have an advantage here. 
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Since there are no relevantly instantiated properties for the perceiving subject to be aware 
of during a hallucinatory experience, and so no instantiated properties are ‘immediately accessible 
to consciousness’, one option that is open to the externalist representationalist is to claim that the 
subject is aware of uninstantiated properties, or universals. This move is now quite popular and is 
endorsed by many philosophers (and not just externalist representationalists). (Bealer, 1982; 
Bengson et al., 2011; Dretske, 2000; Forrest, 2005; Johnston, 2004; McGinn, 1999; Pautz, 2007; 
Sosa, 2007; Tye, 2014a.) Here is Dretske’s account: 
Hallucinations are experiences in which one is aware of properties (shapes, colors, 
movements, etc.) without being o-conscious [object-conscious] of objects having these 
properties.... Hallucinating about pumpkins is not to be understood as an awareness of 
orange pumpkin-shaped objects. It is rather to be understood as p-awareness [property-
awareness] of the kind of properties that o-awareness of pumpkins is usually accompanied 
by....Awareness (ie. p-awareness) of properties without awareness (o-awareness) of objects 
having these properties may still strike some readers as bizarre. Can we really be aware of 
(uninstantiated) universals? Yes, we can, and, yes, we sometimes are. (Dretske, 2000, 
p163)  
And Tye says: 
[Y]ou cannot attend to what is not there. But on my view there is an un-instantiated quality 
there in the bad cases… an un-instantiated quality is present in hallucination. (Tye, 2014b, 
p51) 
 
Let us consider the metaphysical picture we are being offered here. Recall that the phenomenal 
character of an ordinary perceptual experience is constitutively determined by the properties out 
there in the world – the blueness of the ocean, for example. According to the uninstantiated 
property view of hallucination, if Tye’s blue ocean experience had been hallucinatory, then he 
would have been aware, not of the blueness of the ocean – an instantiated property – but of the 
universal ‘blue’. Now, there are two main ways of understanding universals. One can agree with 
Aristotle that universals must be instantiated. This option is metaphysically modest; universals are 
nothing over and above their physical instantiations. The alternative is to agree with Plato that 
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universals exist independently of their instantiations, and are abstract (that is, non-spatiotemporal) 
entities. A commitment to ‘Plato’s Heaven’ is an unlikely component of a physicalist view, and 
yet it is clear that the externalist representationalist has this latter understanding of universals in 
mind.  
To begin with, on the Aristotelian framework, any relation a subject has with a universal 
has to be a relation to an instantiated universal (this is for the simple reason that there are no 
uninstantiated universals). For the externalist representationalist to qualify as an Aristotelian about 
universals, they would have to say that hallucinations are relations to universals that are 
instantiated, but need not be instantiated locally. That is, the universal needs to be instantiated 
somewhere, but the perceiver can be aware of the instantiated universal even if it is not instantiated 
in their immediate environment. This is problematic because the relation appealed to is one of 
awareness. While it may be possible to think about instantiated red (say) when red is not locally 
instantiated, it is difficult to understand the idea that one can be aware of instantiated red when it 
is not locally instantiated.  
Another reason why externalist representationalists must endorse a Platonic conception of 
universals is that it is possible to have hallucinatory experiences of properties that are not 
instantiated anywhere. Brad Thompson makes this point by describing a situation where every red 
thing in the world has been painted another colour. Even though there would no longer be any 
actual instantiations of red, it would still be possible for a subject to hallucinate red. (Thompson, 
2008) Let me add another, less far-fetched example. In his 2007, Paul Churchland describes (and 
indeed provides) a method by which we can experience ‘impossible colours’. By staring at a yellow 
circle on a grey background and then looking at a maximally black stimulus one will experience 
an impossibly dark blue. The experienced blue will be as dark as the maximally black stimulus, 
which is impossible for any objective blue. (See Churchland, 2007 for other examples.) If these 
experiences consist in the subject being aware of uninstantiated universals, then the universals in 
question must be of the Platonic variety.  
This has a significance beyond general metaphysical concerns. By subscribing to a Platonic 
conception of universals, the externalist representationalist is left with a disjunctivist account of 
perceptual experience. Although ordinary perceptual experiences and hallucinations seem to have 
the same structure (they both have a representational content which grounds their phenomenal 
character), it turns out that the similarity is merely superficial. On the one hand we have an 
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experience whose representational content (and phenomenal character) depends essentially on 
instantiated, physical properties; and on the other we have an experience whose representational 
content (and phenomenal character) depends essentially on abstract objects which exist outside the 
concrete, spatiotemporal realm. These are very different kinds of states. 
Perhaps the externalist representationalist will be tempted to revise their account of 
ordinary perceptual experiences, and say that they too are constituted by relations to abstract 
universals.9 That is, all perceptual experiences constitutively depend on relations to abstracta. It is 
important to note that this would require an extensive revision to their account of ordinary 
perceptual experience. I explained in section two the reasons for ascribing the view that ordinary 
perceptual experiences are relations to concrete, spatiotemporal, instantiated properties to 
externalist representationalism; it would certainly be very strange for a naturalistic programme to 
start out by positing essential relations to non-physical, non-natural abstracta.  
What is more, this response would constitute a rather extreme form of Platonic Realism. 
As I understand this view, abstract universals are entities which exist over and above their concrete, 
spatiotemporal instantiations. They play an explanatory role (they explain the similarity relations 
between property instantiations, for example) but they are not what we are perceptually aware of 
when we are perceptually aware of property instantiations. Even Russell, who thought that we 
could be acquainted with abstract universals, did not think that we could be perceptually aware of 
them. (See Russell, 1912, Chapter X.) When we are perceptually aware of red (say) in our everyday 
experiences, we are perceptually aware of concrete instances of red in the spatiotemporal realm, 
and these instances of red are themselves (somehow) related to the abstract universal red (they 
‘exemplify’ red). The externalist representationalist is already pushing the boundaries of Platonic 
Realism by saying that in hallucinations we can be aware of the abstract universals themselves, 
but I think it would be going too far for the Platonic Realist to say that we are always aware (indeed, 
perceptually aware) of the abstract universals themselves. 
As an alternative to the uninstantiated property view, the externalist representationalist 
could take up the idea that hallucinations have gappy contents.10 (See Schellenberg, 2011a, 2011b, 
                                                
9 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this interesting suggestion. 
10 There are different ways of explicating this idea of content – an ordered pair with a gap as one of the 
constituents, identifying the gap with the empty set, employing concepts where some of the concepts are 
empty. My criticism applies across the board; it is independent of any particular way of analysing the gap. 
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and Tye, 2007, 2009. Tye has now abandoned this position 2014a). Tye offers the following way 
of understanding gappy content:  
 
Perhaps we should think of the content of a visual experience as being like a mailbox. In 
the veridical and illusory cases, there is a structure (the mailbox) containing an object the 
letter placed in the slot). In the hallucinatory case, there is the same structure but no object 
(letter in the slot). (Tye, 2014a, p6)11 
 
The key claim of the gappy content view is that veridical and hallucinatory experiences have the 
same structure; it is just that in the ordinary case the content ‘slot’ ultimately gets filled by an 
object instantiating various properties, whereas in the hallucinatory case the content slot remains 
empty. Now, it is true that these states can be described in the same way; they are all 
representational states with a ‘slot’ which can contain objects and their properties. Yet, 
metaphysically speaking, hallucinations and ordinary perceptual experiences would seem to be 
very different.12  
It is difficult to unpack the metaphor of the mailbox and work out what exactly the structure 
is (which in one case contains objects and properties and in the other contains nothing). We saw 
in section two that the externalist representationalist’s transparency-driven analysis of ordinary 
perceptual experience only seems to leave room for properties instantiated by objects in the local 
environment. But even if we allow that there is something in common between ordinary and 
hallucinatory experiences in virtue of their having the same structure, the difference between a 
structure containing objects and properties and a structure containing nothing at all still seems to 
                                                
11 Note, this version of externalist representationalism specifically allows objects as well as properties into 
the content of the perceptual experience. As such, it is more obviously similar to naïve realism than the 
standard view (according to which it is properties rather than objects which are essential to phenomenal 
character). 
12 Ordinarily, disjunctivism is defined as the view that ordinary and hallucinatory perceptual experiences 
are fundamentally different kinds of state. (Martin, 2004, 2006; Johnston, 2004; McDowell, 1982) This is 
the way I understand disjunctivism in this paper. However, I should point out that Schellenberg (along with 
Hinton, 1973; Campbell, 2002b) defines disjunctivism as the view that ordinary and hallucinatory 
perceptual experiences share no common element at all. Since, on her view, the phenomenal character of 
ordinary and hallucinatory experiences involves the subject’s employing the same conceptual or analogous 
non-conceptual structures (Schellenberg, 2011b) her view does not qualify as disjunctivist according to her 
own criteria.  
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be considerable enough to make ordinary perceptual experiences and hallucinatory experiences 
count as fundamentally different kinds of state on this proposal.13  
Perhaps the proponent of the gappy content view will attempt to reify the gap and claim 
that the subject stands in a relation to the empty set (say) in the hallucinatory case. Of course, this 
will not release them from a commitment to disjunctivism. It simply means that their account is 
disjunctivist for the same reason that the uninstantiated property version of externalist 
representationalism is disjunctivist. Namely, that in ordinary perceptual experiences the subject is 
(essentially) related to something concrete (instantiated properties) and in hallucinatory cases the 
subject is (essentially) related to an abstract entity (the empty set).  
4. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that a careful analysis of the externalist representationalist’s account of the 
metaphysics of ordinary perceptual experiences reveals a view which is extremely similar to naïve 
realism. This has some important consequences: first, it makes it difficult to see how we can think 
of perceptual experiences as being representational states at all. The ‘representational’ nature of 
content seems to disappear if content is simply a matter of being aware of properties instantiated 
by objects in the local environment. Second, when we compare the externalist representationalist’s 
account of ordinary perceptual experiences with their account of hallucination, we find that they 
are unable to preserve the common fundamental kind principle. Neither the uninstantiated property 
view of hallucination, nor the gappy content proposal enable the externalist representationalist to 
justify their claim to be able to offer the same analysis of all kinds of perceptual experience. And 
so, like naïve realism, externalist representationalism turns out to be a version of disjunctivism. 
This is a significant finding; externalist representationalism can be regarded as the original 
representationalist position, and it is still a popular and widely-held view. However, its popularity 
rests on its ability to provide a unified account of all perceptual experiences – it is the obvious 
view for anyone who wants to avoid disjunctivism without encountering the epistemological 
objections to other common fundamental kind theories. Now that externalist representationalism 
has been revealed to be a disjunctivist view itself, we have lost the only non-internalist common 
fundamental kind view, and naïve realist disjunctivism has lost a rival.  
                                                
13 I should point out that Tye accepted that his own gappy content view was disjunctivist, and so embraced 
disjunctivism for the time he held the view. (Tye, 2007) 
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